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CONFLICT OF LAWS--1954, TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
There are three Tennessee Supreme Court cases involving Conflict
of Laws and an equal number of federal cases arising in Tennessee.
One of the state cases raises constitutional questions and the United
States Supreme Court may someday disagree with the Tennessee
court.
Stockholders' Liability. This case is Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell.'
The facts are not complicated, but a rather involved mix-up developed
between the state and federal courts.
Doggrell, Konz and Whitaker were sole stockholders in an Arkansas
business association entitled Forest City Wood Products, Inc., with
principal office located in St. Francis County, Arkansas. Doggrell and
Konz were Tennessee residents and left the management to Whitaker.
The corporate charter was prepared and filed with the Secretary of
State, but Whitaker failed to file it with the Clerk of the County Court
of St. Francis County, as required by Arkansas statute. The organiza-
tion became bankrupt and creditors sought to hold Doggrell and Konz
individually liable under a decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court
construing the filing statute and holding that Whitaker was personally
liable.2
The first action brought by a creditor to impose personal liability
upon Doggrell and Konz was in the Federal District Court for Western
Tennessee, where a ruling was made for the plaintiff on the basis of
the Whitaker case. Thereafter an action was brought in the Chancery
Court of Shelby County and the chancellor held for the defendants on
the basis of Woods v. Wicks,- an early Tennessee case holding that
stockholders' liability of this type is to be treated as a penal claim,
not to be enforced in Tennessee. This decision was followed in a
judgment entered without opinion by the Circuit Court of Shelby
County. The Federal District Court ruling was then appealed to the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where it was affirmed
by the two-to-one decision of Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., of
Miss.
The Federal Court of Appeals held that the two Shelby County de-
cisions, being by trial courts whose opinions were not reported, were
not controlling on the federal courts under the Erie, doctrine.5 The
court held that the claim was not penal under the test set out by the
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127 (1953).
2. Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark. 779, 244 S.W.2d 965 (1952).
3. 75 Tenn. 40 (1881).
4. 206 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1953).
5. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58.Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
The court relied upon King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333
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United States Supreme Court in Huntington v. Attrll,6 and it felt that
the earlier decision of Woods v. Wick was distinguishable.
The judgment in the Shelby County Circuit Court was then appealed
to the State Supreme Court and there affirmed in Paper Products Co.
v. Doggrell,7 on the ground that the claim was penal. The decision
was adhered to on petition to rehear though the court's attention was
called to the opinion in the case before the United States Court of
Appeals.
Petition for rehearing was then filed before the Federal Court of
Appeals, and it decided, again two to one, to grant the petition and
reverse the judgment of the District Court. McAllister, J., who dis-
sented in the first hearing, of course agreed with this result on the
merits. Miller, J., who had concurred in the original opinion, did not
agree on the merits but felt that the Erie doctrine applied. Martin, J.,
who had rendered the first opinion, dissented, taking the position that
the problem was a constitutional one and that Tennessee was required
by the full-faith-and-credit clause to enforce the Arkansas statute.8
On the major difference between the two courts-whether the
creditors' claims against the stockholders were penal in nature-the
case of Huntington v. Attrill9 has consistently been recognized as the
leading authority. In this case, the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained that a law which is penal in the domestic sense may well not
be characterized as penal for the purpose of conflict of laws. The test
in the latter situation is "whether its purpose is to punish an offense
against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to
a person injured by the wrongful act," whether the act is in some
sense "a criminal or quasi criminal law."'1
There seems little doubt but that the great majority of the author-
ities would treat the claim under the Arkansas statute as not being
penal under this test." Is the Huntington test controlling or can Ten-
U.S. 153, 68 Sup. Ct. 488, 92 L. Ed. 608 (1948), holding that the federal courts
need not follow the decision of a South Carolina court of common pleas.
State court rules as to conflict of laws are binding on federal courts sitting in
the state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct.
1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941).
6. 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892).
7. 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127 (1953).
8. The opinions on petition to rehear are reported in Doggrell v. Southern
Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
9. 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892). Defendant a director,
had falsely signed a certificate stating that all of the capital stock had been
paid in. He was held personally liable by the New York court on the basis
of the New York statute, and Maryland was required to give full faith and
credit to the New York judgment.
10. 146 U.S. at 673-74, 676.
11. The Arkansas court takes the position that its law simply withholds
the privilege of limited liability until the incorporators have performed the
acts required by the statute. See Gazette Pub. Co. v. Brady, 204 Ark. 396, 162
S.W.2d 494,496 (1942); approved in Whitaker v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 219 Ark.
779, 244 S.W.2d 965 (1952).
This is hardly a criminal statute. The original idea must have been to
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nessee adopt its own test? Maryland could not adopt its own rule in
the Huntington case because a judgment had been obtained and it was
subject to full faith and credit. This meant that the Federal Supreme
Court's test of what constitutes a penal law was controlling on a state
as a part of constitutional law. In the various Doggrefl cases the action
was not on a judgment but directly on the statute. In recent years,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the full-faith-and
credit clause sometimes applies to statutes.12 If, as is not unlikely,13
that Court's position should be that the Arkansas statute is entitled
to full faith and credit, then the Tennessee Supreme Court was wrong
in its holding and Judge Martin was correct as to the action which the
Sixth Circuit should have taken. If the full-faith-and-credit clause is
not applicable, then the Tennessee Court cannot be said to be wrong
though it is following a minority rule, and the Sixth Circuit must adopt
the same rule for a case coming from Tennessee.1
4
Statutes of Limitation: Wrongful Death Actions. In McDaniel v.
Mulvihill/ 5 an action was brought in Tennessee for a traffic accident
in Mississippi resulting in death. The Supreme Court recognized and
applied the general rule of conflict of laws that a right of action in
tort is governed by the law of the state where the injury was incurred.
The Mississippi wrongful death statute therefore applied. But the
Mississippi statute of limitations was six years and the Tennessee limi-
tation was one year. Which should control?
It is the general rule that statutes of limitation are treated as
remedial rather than substantive, so that the law of the forum nor-
protect creditors by letting them look at the county court records of the
principal place of business to see if personal liability was extinguished.
Whether creditors rely on these records in practice today would not seem to
affect the characterization of the act. And the fact that defendant did not know
the charter was not recorded seems irrelevant to the original purpose of the
act or to the present explanation of the Arkansas court
All of the law review discussions of the Tennessee Case are critical of the
holding. See 23 TENN. L. REv. 434, 7 VAwD. L. REV. 281, 40 VA. L. REV. 211
(1954).
12. E. g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 Sup. Ct. 980, 95 L. Ed. 822 (1951).
(wrongful death statute); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589,
79 L. Ed. 1100 (1935) (stockholders' double liability); Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 Sup. Ct. 1355, 91 L. Ed. 1687 (1947)
(fraternal benefit insurance). See Note, 5 VmqD. L. REV. 203 (1952).
13. Several cases have involved stockholders' liability. In addition to Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892), and
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100 (1935), both
cited above, see Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed.
749 (1912).
14. The position of the Tennessee Court that enforcement of the creditors'
claims is against the public policy of Tennessee is subject to the same comment.
Unless the Arkansas statute is entitled to full faith and credit, Tennessee may
decline to enforce the claim on the ground of public policy and the federal
courts in the state must follow the same rule. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941).
15. 263 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1953).
1954]
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mally applies. But there is a well recognized exception when a right
is created by statute and the life duration of this right is also set by the
legislature. This usually occurs when the limitation is in the same
statute, but the "same conclusion would be reached if the limitation
was in a different statute, provided it was directed to the newly
created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified
the right."'6
Most of the cases involving the exception have involved wrongful
death statutes; and the plaintiff, citing the case of Wilson v. Massen-
gill,17 contended that since the Mississippi wrongful death statute
created a new cause of action, the Mississippi limitation should there-
fore apply. The Supreme Court answered that the limitation in Mis-
sissippi was not in the wrongful death statute itself but that the time
limit was "simply that imposed by the Mississippi general statute of
limitations." It might have added that the particular section involved
was a residuary section applying to all other actions not specifically
covered.'8
The decision is well taken, and the same result could have been
reached on another basis. Even if the six-year period had been the
life span of the Mississippi-created cause of action, this would have
meant only that Tennessee could not have entertained an action after
the life span of the cause of action had expired, not that Tennessee
could not have applied its shorter statute of limitations and refused
to allow the action in its courts.19
Statutes of Limitations: Employer's Compensation Insurance Car-
rier's Action Against Negligent Third Party. In Hutto v. Benson, 0 an
employee received an injury by a fall from a scaffold while working
in Texas. After recovering from the employer under the Texas Work-
men's Compensation Act, he brought an action in the federal court in
Tennessee against the defendant for negligently supplying defective
equipment. Plaintiff, Newark Insurance Co., intervened, as the em-
ployer's insurance carrier which had paid the compensation award.
The accident had occurred more than one year before the suit in
Tennessee was filed, and the primary defense was the Tennessee one-
16. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 24 Sup. Ct. 692, 48 L. Ed. 1067 (1904).
17. 124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1942). The case came from a federal district
court sitting in Tennessee and held that the limitation period in the South
Carolina wrongful death statute controlled.,
18. MIsS. CODE Am .§ 722 (1942). The wrongful death section is § 1453.
19. This is indicated by the recent case of Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,
345 U.S. 514, 73 Sup. Ct. 856, 97 L. Ed. 1211 (1953). See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 86 (3d ed. 1949).
20. 110 F. Supp. 355. (E.D. Tenn. 1953), rev'd, 212 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1954).
The decision by the Court of Appeals was published in June of this year and
is therefore outside the Survey period, but no treatment of the holding of
the District Court would be adequate without including the second opinion.
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year statute of limitations. Both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals agreed that the matter of limitation of actions was to be,
treated as procedural under general principles of Conflict of Laws, so
that the law of the forum (Tennessee law, under the Erie doctrine)
would govern. The difference came in determining the nature of the
cause of action to which the Tennessee statute would apply and when
it would start running.
21
The workmen's compensation statutes of both Tennessee and Texas
provide that the employer (or his insurance carrier) who has paid a
compensation award will 'have a cause of action against a third party
whose negligence has injured the employee. The Federal District
Court took the position that the insurance carrier's action was a subro-
gation to the original tort action held by the employee. It said
that though the Texas decisions were to the effect that the statute
of limitations would not run while the employee's compensation suit
was pending, no "independent and severable" cause of action was
created and it was the original cause of action to which the Tennessee
statute was to be applied. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
declared that the Texas- decisions indicate that the cause of action
"does not accrue until the insurer under the Workmen's Compensation
Act has assumed liability for compensation or has paid such com-
pensation. '22 The Tennessee one-year statute would not have expired
if it started running from that time.
Cases differ as to whether the employer or its insurance carrier,
when it has paid a compensation award, has an action at common law
against a third party who has negligently injured the employee.?
Today, however, the compensation acts of the vast majority of the
states do provide for relief of this nature.2 The language of the sec-:
tions varies slightly in its details, but the statutes are clearly based
upon general principles of restitution-preventing the third party,
whose negligence caused the injury, from being unjustly enriched at
the expense of the employer, which is vicariously liable under the Act
even though it was not negligent. Two types of remedies are available.
One is subrogation, sometimes called equitable assignment. Under
subrogation, the employer steps into the shoes of the employee and
enforces the latter's right, being entitled to all priorities which may
21. For a treatment of the Conflicts problem which would have arisen if
the accident had happened in a state with one law as to rights of employer
and employee against the third party and the compensation award had been
made in another state with a different law, see Wade, Joint Tortfeasors and
the Conflict of Laws, 6 V A. L. REv. 464, 476-78 (1953).
22. 212 F.2d at 352, citing Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
23. For discussion, see 2 LARsON, WomcEN's COMPENSATON § 71.30 (1952).
24. The statutes are collected in WaiG~r, SUBROGATION UNDER WoRKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS xii-xxxii (1948).
1954], ,
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be involved.5 The other is indemnity. This is an independent cause
of action running to a person who "has discharged a duty which is
owed by him but which as between himself and another should have
been discharged by the other."
26
On principle it would appear that if the employer's action is based
upon subrogation the statute of limitations on the original cause of
action should apply, while if it is based upon indemnity a new cause
of action is created and the statute of limitations should start running
from the time it is created. Unless the statute clearly indicates that one
of the two remedies is the only one provided for, the plaintiff should
have a choice between the two.2 7 A majority of the courts treat subro-
gation as the basis of the employer's action and hold that the em-
ployer's right is barred by the same statute which applies to the em-
ployee's tort claim. Several courts, however, hold that the statute
starts running on a new cause of action. 2 Strangely, Tennessee, whose
statute was worded in terms of a cause of action arising in the em-
ployer, held that the statute of limitations for the original claim would
apply,2 while Texas, whose statute is worded in terms of subrogation,
may well hold that the statute runs as on a new cause of action3 0
The decision on the problem of Conflict of Laws therefore depends
upon the correct interpretation of the Texas cases concerning the
nature of the cause of action which the employer's insurance carrier
brings. If it is a new cause of action, then the Tennessee statute of
limitations applies, but it cannot start running until the right is
created by Texas law. This would mean that the Court of Appeals is
right. If it is the original cause of action, with the Texas law to the
effect that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended pend-
ing the outcome of the action between employer and employee under
the Compensation Act, then the Tennessee statute of limitations ap-
plies, and it can start running from the time of the accident. A Texas
rule tolling the statute of limitations is no more controlling on a court
sitting in Tennessee than the number of years set out in the Texas
25. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 162 (1937).
26. Id. § 76. The difference between the two remedies as applied to this
fact situation is carefully discussed in Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940).
27. Cf. Foster & G. Co. v. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922).
28. For discussion and collection of the cases, see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 75.30 (1952); WRIGHT, SUBROGATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACTS 18-19 (1948).
29. J. F. Elkins Const. Co. v. Naill Bros., 168 Tenn. 165, 76 S.W.2d 326, 95
A.L.R. 1429 (1934), construing the statute applicable at that time. The present
Tennessee statute speaks of subrogation and assignment and expressly pro-
vides that the employer "shall have six months after such assignment within
which to commence such suit." TENN. CODE ANN. § 6865 (Williams Supp. 1952).
30. See Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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statute. This means that the District Court would be correct. The
Texas decisions-all by intermediate courts-are quite confusing and
it will take a clearer statement from the Supreme Court of the state
before we can tell whether the District Court or the Court of Appeals
correctly interpreted Texas law.31
Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors. In Allbright Bros. V. Hull-
Dobbs Co.,32 a federal case arising in the Western District of Ten-
nessee, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly applied
the Arkansas Joint Tortfeasor statute in a suit for contribution. Ap-
parently both the tort and the payment by one tortfeasor had taken
place there, and the court did not have to make the choice-of-law
decision which would have arisen if these acts had taken place in
different states.
33
Encumbered Automobile. In Lillard v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance
Corp.,3 4 a truck had been sold in Georgia under a conditional sales
contract which was properly recorded there. The vendee took it
without consent or knowledge of Vhe vendor to Tennessee, where it
was attached by a creditor of the vendee and is now in the hands of
a deputy sheriff. In a replevin action by the vendor 5 it was held
that the priority of a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract
"validly executed and legally registered in another State, according
to the laws of that State wherein the property was and the mortgagee
resided, will be recognized and enforced in this State against the
claims of attaching creditors or innocent purchasers in Tennessee,
unless the mortgagee has consented to the removal of the property
into this State, or having knowledge of its removal here, has failed
to assert rights under the mortgage within a reasonable time."36
31. Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) appears to hold
that there is a new cause of action. See the equivocal language in Webster v.
Isbell, 71 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); and Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v.
Texas Power & Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
The Court of Appeals in the instant case seems to interpret the Texas cases
as holding that the cause of action of the employee himself does not "accrue"
or come into being until the employer has paid compensation or assumed
liability. Surely this is not the meaning of the cases. The Texas statute ex-
pressly provides that the employee may at his option sue either the negligent
third person or the employer [TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon
1941)], and there are numerous cases in which the employee sued the third
party directly. Perhaps the proper explanation is that there is a new cause of
action so far as the insurance carrier for the employer is concerned but simply
a suspension of the statute of limitations so far as the employee is concerned.
But see Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Texas & P. Ry., 129 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939).
32. 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).
33. For a detailed consideration of the problems involved under such cir-
cumstances, see Wade, Joint Tort- easors and the Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L.
REv. 464, 472-78 (1953).
34. 263 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1953).
35. This was the assignee of the original vendor, and the original vendee
had also assigned his interest. Proper instruments had been recorded.
36. 263 S.W.2d at 523.
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,This is the rule followed by the great majority of states and is amply
sustained by Tennessee decisions. The problems involved were given
thorough treatment in last year's Survey. 7 The only thing new in this
case is the specific holding that the 1951 Automobile Registration Act
did not change the previous state of the law in this regard.
37. Warren, Personal Property and Sales-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND.
L. REv. 1113, 1117-19'(1953).
